private/public divide and by proposing an alternative framework of engaging law and regulation in wider social life.
Introduction
The drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR') by the then newly formed Council of Europe in 1950 came about after a period of authoritarian rule in Europe, and marked a shift in the endeavour to constrain state power to protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
1 At the same time, however, the Contracting States were reluctant to compromise political decisions on issues such as expropriation, in particular nationalisation, which is often carried out to pursue ambitious economic and social policies. 2 It is therefore not surprising that the Contracting States could not reach agreement on the inclusion of the protection of property rights as human rights in the Convention itself. 3 As a result, the ECHR affords some protection against expropriation, but it grants states a very wide 'margin of 1 C Golay and I Cismas 'Legal Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights Perspective', SSRN
In Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights ('ECtHR') stated that it 'must determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights'. A1P1 itself does not specify compensation provisions. When A1P1 was drafted, the representatives of the Contracting States 'rejected every proposal that contained a reference to compensation'; they feared that the specification of compensation provisions would compromise the implementation of fundamental economic and social policies. 9 That said, A1P1 contains 'an implied right to compensation', as the 'fair balance' test set out in Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden entails that the state must provide compensation that is 'reasonably related to the value of the property'. 10 Many academic works in the discourses of human rights, and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, have supported the proposition that market value offers the best approximation of just compensation. 11 However, market value and guaranteed by the law, which determines the manner of acquisition and enjoyment as well as its limits, in order to ensure its social function and to make it accessible to all').
compensation is not necessarily guaranteed if takings of property are for public purposes, and indeed, in the 'public interest'.
Further, the ECHR's approach to the protection of the right to property is essentially individualistic, affording only limited scope for the protection of communal rights, which are often understood to contrast with individual rights. Treating communal property rights as a fundamental human right is highly contentious. 12 The 'fair balance' test primarily concerns the conflict between individual and public interests. Takings which impact communal networks located within and beyond the boundaries of a single society or nation state have not provoked much discussion and analysis.
This article seeks to decipher the complexity of takings of property and relevant compensation provisions under the ECHR as they apply to property in general and communal property in particular. Drawing on Roger Cotterrell's law-and-community approach that sees 'community' 13 as networks of social relations, and views law as not only grounded in community but also existing to regulate social relations, 14 this article gives an innovative, socio-legal interpretation of controversies surrounding compensation for takings of property.
T Xu and W Gong 'Communal Property Rights in International Human Rights Instruments: Implications for
De Facto Expropriation' in T Xu and J Allain (eds) Property and Human Rights in a Global Context (Oxford:
Hart Publishing) p 225 at p 239. 13 The term 'community' is invoked as both an abstraction and an empirical description. I use the single form of community when referring to the abstraction of its meaning and the plural form when referring to empirical examples of communities. See Section 1 for more discussion. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 of this paper invokes the concept of community and offers a fresh analysis of the law-and-community approach and its relevance for studying takings of property. Sections 2 and 3 apply the law-and-community approach to examining two interrelated issues. The first is whether 'community' interests are properly taken into account in A1P1 and by the ECtHR in identifying the notion of 'possessions' (Section 2).
The second is whether the importance of 'community' is appropriately taken into account by the ECtHR in evaluating issues such as fair balance and proportionality and in assessing compensation (Section 3). Section 3(c) specifically examines cases involving indigenous peoples and communal property before the ECtHR. Due to limited space, the paper focuses on A1P1 under the ECHR and takings in the UK and Europe, although it does draw some comparative perspectives from the American system. As an old social science concept, there are many interpretations of what community is or should be. 16 It may be better understood with reference to some common characteristics or bonds that hold people together. Locality is important; people are often bound together via living in a common place. That said, community is not merely a geographical notion, as people may be bound together by a common interest that transcends the territorial boundaries. Community may be formed by a distinctive network of social relations or style of life (for example, the community of farmers, pastoral community, etc.). 17 Community may also be shaped by a strong sense of connection or belonging, for example, many communities have members who share a distinctive 'identity' (for example, indigenous community).
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The law-and-community approach developed by Roger Cotterrell sees 'community' as networks of social relations held together by a variety of bonds (eg, convergence of economic interests, shared customs and common values). 19 In this approach, the idea of community differs from our usual understanding that sees community as physical and geographical entities 20 To put it another way, community 'is not a thing but a quality of social relations'. 21 Seen through the lens of community, abstract society is disaggregated 'into many different networks of social relations in and beyond nation states'.
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Drawing on Weber's four ideal types of social action (traditional, affectual, instrumentally rational and value-rational), 23 Cotterrell's networks of community encompass four ideal types of community: instrumental community, traditional community, community of belief, and affective community. In this approach, one ideal type of community (eg, community of belief)
is not to be equated with one empirical manifestation of community (eg, a church); rather it represents a distinctive type of 'collective involvement', and can be combined with other types of community 'in complex ways in actual group life'.
24
Referring to the four types of community, instrumental community is mainly driven by economic and utilitarian values and interests. Traditional community is based on co-existence in the shared environment including the same locality, cultural and social tradition, historical experience, and so on. Affective community is shaped by emotion or friendship, which is often significant when dealing with issues regarding marriage and divorce, succession, and elderly 20 Ibid, p 67. of their conditions of existence in their environment'. 35 The second level deals with communal networks and the law operating in each of these networks. The rules and norms generating from one network coexist, overlap, and interpenetrate with rules and norms generating from other networks. The processes through which these networks interact with each other also affect the extent to which national/supranational/international law can be accommodated in these networks it purports to regulate. The third level concerns the penetration of national/supranational/international law into less powerful communal networks, which may lead to the changes of community norms and rules generating from these networks.
Supranational/international law such as the ECHR is often closely linked to particular types of community (eg, smaller networks of law makers) and therefore has an enduring problem of securing cultural legitimacy when it tries to regulate all types of community. 36 Here cultural legitimacy refers to legitimacy of the law that each communal network creates that is 'derived directly from the cultural conditions of the network itself (from the common interests of its members, from its unifying beliefs or values, from its traditions, collective allegiances, etc.)'.
37
Turning to the conception of property, one of the key issues in examining takings of property, the law-and-community approach further allows us to recognise a plethora of types of property rooted in various communal networks and their cultural conditions, in particular, communal forms of property, encompassing both spatial and temporal dimensions. For example, people share a sense of belonging via living in a common place, and they follow the same rules of the 35 Cotterrell, above n 29. He argues that 'many people, reported as advocating "remain", seemed to rely on the image of the UK as a primarily economic communal network', but lacked the attention to the national environment of co-existence and threats to it. 36 Cotterrell, above n 21. 
Reviewing the Notion of 'Possessions' in A1P1 and its Implications for Conceptualising

Takings of Property
There are significant differences between civil law and common law approaches to the concept of property. In civil law jurisdictions, 'the idea of the "absolute" character of the domination over a thing was … closely connected with that of its "inviolability" and "sanctity" which derived its polemical pathos from the fight against feudal burdens and restrictions'. rights, in the common law lexicon, the term "property" indicates both property rights and the object of property rights'. 46 The British representatives observed that 'the word "possessions,"
used in the English text, is not a really satisfactory word…It is a word that would not be found, in a British Act of Parliament or any other document'.
47
Some guidance on interpreting the meaning of possessions in A1P1 comes from comparative law. Some comparative property lawyers have rejected the existence of 'a watertight separation' between civil law and common law approaches to property. We also need to bear in mind that those cases have been decided by a small network of judges and that the conceptual tools that jurists and lawmakers use to represent social dynamics may be quite different from the social dynamics themselves.
In Gasus-Dosier und Fördertechnik v The Netherlands, the scope of the notion of possessions in A1P1 has expanded from ownership of physical goods to certain rights and interests. 51 The
ECtHR held that the notion of possessions 'has an autonomous meaning which is certainly not limited to ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as "property rights", and thus "possessions" for the purposes of this provision'. 52 The autonomous meaning of possessions under the ECHR recognises that '"possessions" are created by national law, but that the Court is free to reach its own conclusion on the application of national law to the specific facts of the case'. Apart from generally recognised real and personal property, categories of possessions now include company shares, 55 goodwill in a business, 56 intellectual property rights such as patents, 57 security rights under a retention of title clause, 58 planning permission, 59 rights of user, 60 and so on. 61 The ECtHR has also extended the scope of possessions to include 'the applicants' legitimate expectation of being able to carry out their proposed development'.
62
Further, ' "possessions" can be either "existing possessions" or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a "legitimate expectation"
of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right'.
63
'A legitimate expectation must have a "sufficient basis in national law"'. 64 The court, therefore, has adopted 'an economic value approach to the notion of possessions' that include both present and future economic interests. 65 Through adopting the economic value approach, the Convention meaning of possessions serves as a unifying concept that minimises the differences among the Contracting States in interpreting the notion of property to a certain extent. However, it is not sufficiently broad to 55 include communal land, cultural resources and other communal interests. As discussed in Section 1(b), the ECHR, one kind of supranational law, is grounded in a confined communal network that is much narrower than the communal network made up of the population it is purported to regulate. Every communal network has its predominant interest, which the ECHR has not sufficiently taken into account. To be sure, the market value approach to compensation is based on an understanding that all property is to be 'fungible' and 'fully interchangeable with money'. 71 However, it is not entirely incompatible with the social approach to compensation, because ultimately the market value reflects 'a community consensus' on the value of the property rather than the owner's Moreover, whether the taking is considered by the ECtHR to constitute 'deprivation of ownership' or 'state control over the use of property' will lead to different consequences. The deprivation of ownership usually guarantees compensation (not necessarily with full market value if it is for the public interest), whereas state control of the use of property (even though the applicant had lost possessions) does not always give rise to an entitlement to compensation.
Pye v United Kingdom is a seminal case highlighting this distinction, which is blurred and subject to debate. 75 Eg, James v United Kingdom, above n 4, at [54] . 76 Pye v United Kingdom, above n 5, at [54] . 77 See eg, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, above n 4; Pine Valley Developments Ltd and others v Ireland, above n 59.
The ECtHR ruled that 'the applicant companies were […] affected, not by a "deprivation of possessions" within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1, but rather by a "control of use" of land within the meaning of the second paragraph of the provision'. 78 The second paragraph of A1P1 reserves to the states the right to enact such laws as they deem necessary to control the use of property according to general interest. To put it another way, states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to choosing the means of enforcement of the law and ascertaining whether such enforcement will be justified in the general interest. 79 The initial assessment of whether there exists a public interest in justifying the taking of property is often left to the national authorities.
However, the debates whether there was real public or general interest in the law on adverse possession in the case of registered land remain largely unresolved. This is due in part to the fact that the function of the property in question is interpreted in different ways. In Pye, the UK government argument was that 'land was a limited resource, and it was in the public interest that it should be used, maintained and improved'. This argument seems to have emphasised the conservation function of the property in question.
Again seen in the light of the law-and-community approach, the conceptions of the function of property, fair balance, and compensation provision largely depend on interactions between the individual, the communal network(s) he/she belongs to, and the wider society with respect to the property in issue. Leaving the initial assessment of whether there exists a public interest to the national authorities without considering such interactions will make some of the ECtHR's decisions controversial.
(b) The Social Approach and Proportionality
The social approach to compensation emphasises the social function of property, which allows for reasonable constraints on the use of private property in order to secure the public interest and even state sanctions of extinguishment of title. The 'social-function norm' of property was proposed by the French law professor Léon Duguit in the early twentieth century 82 We also tend to ignore that an individual may feel one kind of interference brings more justice than another kind of interference because he/she sees different kinds of interference through not only her/her personal experience but also the communal network(s) he/she belongs to.
Proportionality deals with the balance between individual interests and 'conflicting public interests'. 96 More precisely, as discussed above, proportionality deals with the balance between individual interests and conflicting and overlapping interests of different types of community.
Disaggregating the meaning of the public interest to include conflicting and overlapping interests of different types of community is important. As Snyder argues:
[Interests] serve as analytical tools for understanding legal ideas, institutions, and processes, and as such help to define the salient features of law's social context… Thus they are indispensable to any understanding of the causes and consequences of the creation, reproduction, or transformation of law.
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Seen through the law-and-community approach, the interactions between individual interests and the law are mediated by the communal network(s) the individual belongs to. Applying this perspective to rethinking compensation relevant to proportionality, many questions will arise:
is there a unified approach to compensation for takings of property? Or should compensation be re-evaluated in relation to different types of community? Let us imagine two scenarios: the state, for the public interest, acquires land owned by a large, powerful company and land owned by an individual living in a small, close-knit community. In the first scenario, the taking may primarily affect instrumental community, so market value compensation may be easily justified and the 'fair balance' test can also be satisfied. In the second scenario, the taking may affect the individual's interest grounded in noninstrumental community (traditional community, affective community, and community of belief) in additional to instrumental community. The social approach to compensation becomes less effective in this context, as it overlooks a variety of communal networks situated between individuals and society as a whole. Should considerations be given to the individual's loss of attachment to these non-instrumental types of community as part of the compensation provisions? Of course, taking real account of different types of community is difficult and may be beyond the capacity of judges. But an additional amount of compensation at least can be awarded to reflect such loss.
(c) Cases Involving Indigenous Peoples and Communal Property
The communal networks involving indigenous peoples are mainly 'non-instrumental', arising from co-existence in the same locality and shared language, culture, traditions, identity, and historical experience, etc. 98 Although these communal networks now fall within the 'jurisdiction' of some nation-state or other, the governance of such communal networks and communal resources involves the recognition of 'an additional structure of internal rules, rights, duties, and beliefs which mediates and shapes the community's relationship with its natural surroundings'. conceptions. 100 Here, I adopt one conception which regards communal property as resources owned, used, or governed by a group of people defined by reference to some common characteristics. This conception speaks to the law-and-community approach that sees community as networks of social relations held together by a variety of bonds such as locality, values and interests; communal property not only recognises these networks of social relations but also manifests itself in these social relations. It is difficult to apply the Non-instrumental community, however, does not exist by isolating itself from other types of community. Conflicts between non-instrumental community and instrumental community may arise in instances where modern economic activities interfere with indigenous tenure and give rise to 'dispossession' and threats to accustomed security of access to communal resources.
The perceptions of just takings of property within non-instrumental community may be fundamentally different from those within 'instrumental community'.
Compared to those international instruments discussed above, the evolution of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding indigenous peoples is rather slow. Several cases involving indigenous peoples heard before the Court show that the ECHR is not very effective in cases involving communal relationships and communal property. 107 As discussed above, the ECHR is not rooted in all types of community, and its regulatory ambition to govern all types of community faces an enduring problem of securing legitimacy.
The protection afforded by the ECHR is mostly procedural rather than substantive, and indigenous complaints have primarily relied on Article 6 and 8 and A1P1 of the ECHR. There has been a lack of landmark cases decided by the ECtHR in favour of indigenous peoples. traditional practices, which involved visiting, honouring and maintaining ancestral graves, remain culturally significant. However, the inability of Chagossians to perform such practices since expulsion reinforces the severance of wider cultural connections. 119 The deportation had adverse social, cultural, environmental and spiritual impact on not only the islanders as individuals but also the intergenerational, relational aspect of the group as a whole. However, the compensation package did not take such losses into account. More remedial measures should be considered, for example, facilitating the restoration of solidarity of the communal networks adversely affected by takings. Here a useful comparator may be developments in environmental law regarding compensation for environmental damage:
compensation should 'consist of repairing/restoring the affected natural environment "in kind"
or to its natural state'. 120 For takings cases involving indigenous peoples, it seems just to allow indigenous peoples 'to return to their traditional territories when the reasons for their banishment cease to exist'.
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Conclusion: Establishing a Law-and-community Approach to Compensation
Takings of property are an area that witnesses the increasing penetration of national/supranational/international law into both the macro and micro levels of society.
Studying takings, therefore, requires a sociological analysis of the role of law in social experience and the law's interaction with vested interests and social relations. Whether takings can be socially justified is largely dependent on how law engages with different interests and social relations. This article offers a useful analytical tool for examining such engagement through applying and developing a law-and-community approach. In this approach, the abstract notion of society has been disaggregated into different types of community, coexisting, overlapping and interpenetrating. A socially justified taking requires law to not only engage in different types of community but also strengthen cooperation within and between different types of community.
It should be noted that, in practice, as national/supranational/international law is not often rooted in all the communal networks it purports to regulate, it would be potentially very difficult for the Contracting States to permit the ECtHR to engage in this kind of analysis in most cases. However, the law-and-community approach is still useful, because it allows us to re-evaluate the current approaches to compensation for taking of property under the ECHR.
The amount of market value compensation is a matter that falls within the margin of appreciation of the state, subject to European supervision in the light of the proportionality approach to compensation may be easily justified. But if the taking also affects types of noninstrumental community, the market value approach becomes less effective, as the market value approach often concentrates on the economic loss of individuals in takings of property and overlooks the needs to consider the loss of communal interests and identities especially in cases involving indigenous peoples. The ECtHR should not assume that market value compensation is viewed as just compensation by everyone or necessarily strikes a fair balance.
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The social approach to compensation is based on an understanding that property carries certain social functions and property owners bear social obligations. However, the 'public interest'
that is essential for justifying this approach is too broad and vague seen through the law-andcommunity approach. The individual's conception of the public interest is mediated by the communal network(s) he/she belongs to. Like the market value approach, the social approach overlooks a wide range of types of community between individuals and the state and conflicting and overlapping interests of different types of community.
The limits of the current approaches to compensation for takings of property are also manifest in the ECHR's limited protection for indigenous peoples' property rights. The ECHR lacks groundings in communal networks held together by custom and tradition, and the ECtHR has an ambivalent attitude towards the recognition of communal property rights.
The law-and-community approach can remedy the shortcomings of the current approaches in at least three aspects. First, it helps recognise property rights whose legitimacy may derive from communal networks which are composed of intergenerational social relations between individuals and groups of people with respect to the land and other natural resources. These social relations are shaped and reshaped by a variety of bonds such as shared tradition and style of life. For cases involving indigenous peoples, if we recognise such social relations, we can argue that these groups' land rights 'extend beyond ownership rights to include possessory and use rights over lands traditionally accessed for subsistence and other purposes'.
123
Second, when there are conflicts between different rights claims, or, indeed, conflicts between different communal networks, there needs to be at least a process of dialogue and consultation or overarching international guidelines so that one group of social interests will not easily be trumped by another kind of social interest and vice versa. The law-and-community approach to compensation rejects the simple quantification of the indigenous peoples' losses without prior consultation and consent. The law-and-community approach to compensation also rejects a one-size-fits-all solution. Compensation provisions for a taking predominately affecting instrumental community may not be suitable for a taking predominately affecting traditional community.
Finally, as communal networks transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, cutting across the local and the globe, the law-and-community approach will be useful for developing takings law from a global perspective. For example, it will be helpful to develop the jurisprudence of the ECtHR through keeping pace with the progress of international law, international human rights and 'soft law' instruments regarding indigenous peoples. 124 These instruments recognise
